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Act (“UFTA”), as enacted in Florida, authorizes a receiver standing in the shoes of the
corporation, to commence certain fraudulent conveyance actions against third parties.5
A receiver, however, lacks standing to bring claims on behalf of a corporation, where a
receiver is unable to treat the corporation as a separate legal entity from the insiders who
perpetrated the fraud.6 Thus, in the case of a Ponzi scheme, where the enterprise that existed was
fraudulent, an issue arises as to whether a receiver, acting on behalf of the company that
managed the Ponzi scheme, has standing to bring such claims.7 In such cases, a majority of
courts have found that a receiver lacks standing to commence a fraudulent conveyance action
because the corporation and insiders were functionally equivalent.8 The only entities entitled to
bring such claims are the individual customers who lost their assets.9
For example, in Isaiah v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that a receiver lacked standing to commence an action against a
financial institution for aiding and abetting a Ponzi scheme, because he represents the
receivership and not the individuals who were the actual victims of the fraud.10 Thus, since the
receiver stands in the shoes of the corporation, the bad acts of the corporation remain inherently
within the receivership.11 Additionally, the court held that the court-appointed receiver could not
recover a deposit made by its principals into various bank accounts within the same financial
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institution, because under UFTA, such a transaction was not a “transfer” within the meaning of
the statutory language, regardless of whether such amounts were the subject of a Ponzi scheme.12
Part I of this memorandum addresses what qualifies as a “transfer” under the specific
language of Florida’s enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and why an
intercompany transfer between two bank accounts cannot be deemed a transfer. Then, part II
analyzes the claims that a receiver can bring and when a receiver lacks standing to bring such
claims. Finally, Part III concludes with addressing who, if anyone, may actually have standing to
recover the fraudulent transfers in those scenarios.
I.

Determining if a “Transfer” Under UFTA has Occurred
A. Defining “Transfer” Under UFTA
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that creditors may avoid a debtor’s

fraudulent transfers to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor’s claim.13 To prevail on a claim
of actual fraud, a creditor must demonstrate (1) there was a creditor to be defrauded, (2) a debtor
intending fraud, and (3) a transfer of property which could have been applicable to the payment
of the debt due.14 Currently, UFTA defines a “transfer” as “every mode, direct or indirect,
absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or
interest in an asset.”15 Although the definition of transfer is broad, the statute explicitly requires
the plaintiff to show that the debtor either disposed of his asset or relinquished some interest in
that asset.16
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In determining whether a transfer was made with actual intent to defraud a creditor,
courts look to “badges of fraud” that indicate whether fraud has occurred.17 These badges of
fraud include whether, for example, the transfer was to an insider, the debtor remained in control
of the property after the transfer, the transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets, or the
debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made.18 However, proof
that a transfer was made in furtherance of a Ponzi scheme generally establishes actual intent to
defraud under UFTA, without the need to consider whether the badges of fraud are present.19
Thus, a determination that a corporation was operated as a Ponzi scheme is in itself enough to
qualify any transfers made to or from the receiverships as qualifying transfers made to defraud
creditors under UFTA.20
B. Application of “Transfer” Definition in the Context of Intercompany Transfers
The Eleventh Circuit found that a routine bank deposit, however, is not a transfer under
UFTA.21 Under UFTA, whether a transfer has occurred hinges on if the debtor has relinquished
some interest or control over the asset.22 Intercompany transfers clearly do not fall within such
standard.23 That is, because, at all relevant times, the accountholder had access to the funds it
deposited – i.e., it never relinquished control.24
Similarly, the definition of “transfer” under the Bankruptcy Code also excludes ordinary
deposits.25 Under section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, a “transfer” is defined as “(A) the
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creation of a lien; (B) the retention of title as a security interest; (C) the foreclosure of a debtor’s
equity of redemption; or (D) each mode . . . of disposing or parting with —(i) property; or (ii) an
interest in property.”26 In determining that an ordinary deposit does not fall within the express
language of the definition of transfer, courts have relied upon the fact that a deposit of money
upon general account with a bank “creates an ordinary debt, not a privilege right of fiduciary
character.”27 And this “ordinary debt,” with the Bank’s corresponding obligation that the funds
be available at the depositor’s will, corresponds with the notion that control of the money has
never been relinquished by the depositor and thus the action cannot be deemed a transfer.28
II.

A Court-Appointed Receiver Does Not Have Standing to Recover Fraudulent
Transfers Under UFTA if the Action was Not Previously Owned by the Party in the
Receivership
A. Role of the Court-Appointed Receiver
While a receivership is typically created to protect the rights of creditors, the receiver is

not the class representative for creditors and receives no general assignment of rights from the
creditors.29 Rather, the receiver is limited to bringing only those actions previously owned by the
party in the receivership.30 These include “actions that the corporation, which has been
‘cleansed’ through receivership, may bring directly against the principals or the recipients of
fraudulent transfer of corporate funds to recover assets rightfully belonging to the corporation
and taken prior to the receivership.”31 Thus, while the receiver has standing to recover assets
rightfully belonging to a corporation, this only applies when the actions of the corporation can be
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separated from the actions of a rogue employee.32 If this separation has not been adequately
established, the receiver cannot pursue claims otherwise owned directly by the creditors.33
B. Standing of the Court-Appointed Receiver
The receivership entities that the court-appointed receiver represents cannot assert a tort
claim against a third party for aiding and abetting a Ponzi scheme because the entity itself was
not injured.34 Rather, it was the individual investors who actually suffered the loss.35 The
Eleventh Circuit held in Isaiah that because the state court order in the case specifically
authorized and empowered Isaiah to file suit to recover only property of the receivership entities
that actually belonged to the receivership entities, any claims of aiding and abetting belong to the
defrauded investors and not the receivership entity.36 Thus, Isaiah did not have standing to
pursue a claim.37
III.

A Corporation does not have Standing to Recover Fraudulent Transfers Under
UFTA if it has not been “Cleansed” of the Sins of its Predecessor
Courts have found that whether a claim can be made on behalf of a receivership depends

on whether the corporation is found to have been “cleansed” through receivership, or whether the
fraud and intentional torts of the insiders can be separated from the corporation itself.38
A. Cleansing Through Receivership
“Where a corporation is operated by a Ponzi scheme, it is still in the eyes of the law a
separate entity with rights and duties.”39 When assets that are meant to be used for the
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corporation’s stated purpose are transferred for an unauthorized purpose to the detriment of the
defrauded investors, the corporation itself is harmed because the defrauded investors are tort
creditors of the corporation.40 Although the corporation may have participated in the fraudulent
transfers prior to receivership, once the individual tortfeasor is removed and a receiver is
appointed, the corporation becomes entitled to the return of its assets that had been diverted for
unauthorized purposes, e.g., to perpetrate a Ponzi scheme.41 Thus, for example, a corporation had
standing to sue under UFTA when investor funds were fraudulently diverted to the defendant
“‘for the lease of a luxury car.’”42 The corporation became a creditor of the Ponzi schemer at the
time he fraudulently diverted investor funds for his personal use because, as UFTA requires, the
corporation had a ‘claim’ against him.43
However, this principal only stands when “[t]he money it receives from investors [is]
used for the corporation’s stated purpose.”44 If the corporation’s sole purpose is to promote the
Ponzi scheme, this principal does not apply because it is impossible to prove the corporation
served any other legitimate purpose.45
B. Separating a Corporation from its Insiders
Unless the corporation in receivership has at least one honest member on the board of
directors, or an innocent stockholder, the fraud and intentional torts of the insiders cannot be
separated from the corporation itself, and the corporation cannot be said to be an entity separate
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and distinct from the individual tortfeasors.46 In Freeman, the court-appointed receiver was
unable to establish that NorthAmerican, the receivership entity, was “freed . . . from the spell” of
the Grazianos, the insiders who actually committed the fraud.47 Thus, because Mr. Freeman was
unable to show that any honest person existed within NorthAmerican, who was not at all times
simultaneously under the control of the Grazianos, he was unable to establish that there was any
injury suffered by NorthAmerican in its capacity as a corporation.48 As said torts cannot be
separated from the receivership entities, the receivership as a whole is liable for the actions
perpetrated on behalf of the Ponzi scheme, and it cannot recover.49
C. Standing to Recover
While the corporation and the receiver of the corporation both lack standing to recover
any fraudulent transfers perpetrated by the Ponzi scheme, this does not leave investors entirely
without remedy.50 While the corporation did not suffer injury as a result of the Ponzi scheme,
individual customers who suffered injury based on their coerced investments may have a right to
pursue claims that allegedly aided and abetted that scheme.51 To allow otherwise would
essentially “usurp the claims that properly belong to those creditors.”52 This emphasis on
allowing only individual creditors to pursue tort claims against third parties limits the role of
court-appointed receivers in this realm and dismantles the receivership entity when it comes to
third party liability. However, it does assure individual investors that there are potential means
for recovery.
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Conclusion
Although a court-appointed receiver is generally provided to protect the rights of
creditors, an individual’s role as a receiver is limited to standing in the shoes of the receivership
as an entity.53 Therefore, unless a corporation is said to have been cleansed of the sins of its
predecessor, any fraudulent claims against a third party cannot be made either by the corporation
itself or the court-appointed receiver.54 Furthermore, while a determination of who has standing
is relevant in an analysis of recovering under UFTA, the fraudulent transfers looking to be
recovered must also fall within the statutory definition of a transfer.55
Henceforth, while neither a court-appointed receiver, nor the corporation itself, have
standing to bring a common law tort action against a third party for aiding and abetting a Ponzi
scheme, individual creditors in their capacity as defrauded investors have standing to pursue
these claims if the transfer qualifies as a relinquishment of funds by the fraudster.56

53

Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1306.
55
Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14).
56
See Freeman, 865 So.2d at 553; see Fla. Stat. § 726.102(14); see also Isaiah, 960 F.3d at 1302.
54

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

